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FAMILY TAX PROBLEMS
The family relationship is often the source of numerous tax problems.
Two of the more frequently occurring questions involve the disposition
of beneficiary interests and the termination of an undesirable joint own-
ership. The first of these problems is analyzed in detail by Mr. John H.
Butala. Focusing his discussion on interests in trusts and estates, the au-
thor provides insight into the methods of disposing of these interests by
renunciation, assignment, or sale. Of primary importance to the tax at-
torney are Mr. Butala's observations on the tax consequences of each of
these methods of disposition. Mr. W. Dean Hopkins summarizes tax
effects of a termination of an unwanted joint ownership. Effectively
utilizing a husband and wife example as the basis for his discussion, the
author concentrates his efforts upon the termination of joint ownership
in bank accounts, treasury bonds, real estate, and securities. He also gives
special consideration to the gift, estate, and inheritance tax consequences
involved in the termination of joint ownership of these types of property.
The Disposition of Trust, Probate
and Related Property Interests
John H. Butala, Jr.
AX LITERATURE abounds with advice to the property owner
who is contemplating an original disposition of his property.
However, considerably less advice is available to the beneficiary of
property who wishes to dispose of his acquired interest. Therefore,
this article will be concerned
with the legal and tax conse-
THE AUTHOR (A.B., LL.B., Western quences involved in the disposi-
Reserve University) is a Vice President tion of beneficiary interests, as
of The Cleveland Trust Company, Cleve-
land, Ohio. contrasted with original owner
interests. The original owner,
however, will be considered in
the situation in which he has previously made an irrevocable trans-
fer of property but has retained an interest of which he now wishes
to dispose. The property interests considered will be limited to in-
terests in trusts and estates and to such other interests as are most
frequently encountered by persons dealing in trust and probate
matters.
There are three basic methods by which a donee or a prospec-
tive donee of property may dispose of his interest: (1) He may re-
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nounce or disclaim the gift; (2) He may accept the gift and sub-
sequently assign or release it to another person; or (3) He may
accept the gift and subsequently sell it to another person.
I. RENUNCIATION OR DISCLAIMER
A. General Definitions
A renunciation or disclaimer is the refusal by a person to accept
ownership of property which another attempts to confer upon him.1
The same concept may also be expressed by other terms, such as
waiver. It should be distinguished from an assignment or release,
both of which refer to the transfer of property to another after one
has already accepted ownership of the property. The term relin-
quishment is also used to denote an assignment or release, although
on occasion relinquishment is erroneously equated with disclaimer
or renunciation. One can relinquish property only after he has
acquired ownership.
B. Types of Property Which May Be Renounced
A beneficiary of an interest in property may renounce his in-
terest only in certain circumstances. The decisive factor in deter-
mining whether renunciation is permissible is often the type of
property conveyed.
(1) Bequest or Devise.-The rule is well established that one
may disclaim or renounce a bequest or devise under a will.? A be-
quest or devise constitutes an offer of a testamentary gift which one
is free to accept or reject. A person cannot be compelled to accept
a gift against his wishes.
(2) Gift in Trust.-The authorities are in agreement that a
gift in trust may be renounced for the same reasons applicable to
the renunciation of a bequest or devise, at least where the trust in-
strument does not contain a spendthrift clause.' If the instrument
does contain such a provision, there are indications in a number of
cases that the beneficiary cannot renounce.4 This view appears to
be erroneous. A spendthrift clause is designed to prohibit an as-
1 Ohio Nat'l Bank v. Miller, 57 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943).
21d. at 718; See Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290-
U.S. 641 (1933) (applying Ohio law); United States v. McCrackin, 189 F. Supp. 632
(S.D. Ohio 1960) (applying Ohio law).
3 1 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 36.1 (2d ed. 1956); Central Nat'l Bank v. Eells, 5 Ohio,
Misc. 187 (P. Ct. 1965).
4 See cases cited in 3 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 337.7.
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signment or a transfer of an interest which previously has been ac-
cepted. As noted above, a renunciation does not involve an assign-
ment or release, but rather a refusal to accept. Clearly, if one is
free to reject an absolute gift, he should be permitted to reject one
which has conditions attached to it. This view has been adopted
by the Tax Court in a federal estate tax charitable deduction case.'
(3) Intestate Succession.-The prevailing view at common
law was that one could not renounce property which was vested in
him by the Statute of Descent and Distribution.' This view was
based on the theory that although one may refuse to accept property
which another attempts to confer upon him, intestate property vests
in a person absolutely as a matter of law. There is no offer of a
gift which the transferee may accept or reject. The soundness of
this reasoning is open to question, and the common law rule has
been changed by statute in some states including Ohio.7
(4) Joint and Survivorship Property.-Three cases in Ohio
have considered renunciations of joint and survivorship property.
In In re Estate of Krakoff,8 a decedents widow renounced her in-
terest in certain savings accounts, a commercial account, and corpo-
rate securities, all of which previously had been held in joint and sur-
vivorship form with the decedent. The Probate Court of Franklin
County held that her renunciation was effective, and that these as-
sets consequently became property of the probate estate. The valid-
ity of the renunciation was upheld on the ground that the joint and
survivorship ownership arose under a contract which purported to
confer a gift upon a third party beneficiary who was free to accept
or reject the gift, much the same as a legatee or devisee. In Hershey
r Estate of James M. Schoonmaker, Jr., 6 T.C. 404 (1946). Renunciation of trust
income under a spendthrift trust is sanctioned by statute in Pennsylvania if the re-
nounced income passes to one or more of the beneficiary's descendants. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 301.3 (1955). See Rev. Rul. 62, 1964-1 CuM. BULL. 221, which
recognizes a renunciation under this statute for income tax purposes.
6 lanthe B. Hardenbergh, 17 T.C. 166 (1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
7 OHIO RiV. CODE § 2105.061. The section provides as follows:
Any competent adult entitled to receive any right, title, or interest in any
property through intestate succession as provided by Section 2105.06 of the
Revised Code, may renounce such interest by filing a written statement of
renunciation with the probate court within sixty days after notice of the hear-
ing on inventory of the intestate's property has been given....
See also ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 15b-d (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 6-604 (1953); N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAW § 87-a; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §5 34-5-1 to
-12 (1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4095a (Supp. 1960); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 237.01
(8) (Supp. 1960).
8179 N.E2d 566 (Ohio P. Ct. 1961).
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v. Bowers,' an Ohio court of appeals decision, the majority opinion
also recognized the effectiveness of a renunciation of joint and sur-
vivorship certificates of deposit for Ohio inheritance tax purposes.
The Ohio Department of Taxation had argued that the right to the
property interest accrued upon death, that the tax was levied upon
interests existing as of the moment of death, and that the subsequent
action of the survivor therefore could not affect the taxable succes-
sions already determined. These contentions were rejected by the
court on the ground that mere establishment of a joint and survivor-
ship account does not create a new ownership interest unless there
is an assent or acceptance by the third party beneficiary." Although
this assent is normally presumed, the presumption may be rebutted
by evidence of a disclaimer. The value of the decision as precedent
is limited, however, since the issue presented to the court involved
a technical tax question rather than the validity of the disclaimer. In
fact, the disclaimer had been found to be effective for property law
purposes in a declaratory judgment action filed in the Probate
Court," and the appellate court assumed its validity in the tax case.
The decision in the Hershey case is contrary to that reached earlier
by the Probate Court of Fulton County in In re Bauer.12 The latter
case may therefore be regarded as having been superseded by a later,
higher court decision. The Bauer case, however, involved an un-
usual factual situation which possibly may distinguish it from
Hershey v. Bowers.' In Bauer the residue of the probate estate
passed to decedent's three sisters. His niece filed a disclaimer of
certain joint and survivorship bank accounts with the executor.
The accounts were thereupon treated as probate assets, and the three
sisters and niece filed claims against the estate for services rendered
in amounts sufficient to consume the estate and to eliminate any
inheritance tax. Although the holding in the case was formally
based upon the principle that subsequent action by a beneficiary can-
not affect successions which accrue at the moment of death, the
court obviously doubted the bona fides of the transactions. Thus,
9 1 Ohio App. 2d 511, 205 N.E.2d 590 (1965).
1l Id. at 513, 515.
11Id. at 512.
12 191 N.E.2d 859 (Ohio 1962).
13 1 Ohio App. 2d 511, 205 N..2d 590 (1965). See also Bradley v. State, 100
N.H. 232, 123 A.2d 148 (1956); Lundborg v. Commissioner, CCH INH., EST. &
GIFT TAx REP. 94330 (Minn. Bd. Tax. App. 1962), which came to the same con-
clusion.
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the real basis for the holding is probably that the renunciation was
not genuine, but rather was used simply as a tax avoidance device.
Theoretically, there is no reason why a joint and survivorship in-
terest may not be renounced. If one may reject a proffered gift un-
der a will or trust agreement, he should similarly be permitted to
reject a gift created by a third party beneficiary contract. Indeed,
virtually no distinction, either in form or in substance, can be made
in this respect between a gift of a trust interest and a gift of a joint
and survivorship interest. As a practical matter, however, only in
rare cases will the survivor-donee not be regarded as having accepted
the gift, and thus being precluded from renouncing it. As to bank
accounts, it is common practice to have the third party beneficiary
sign the bank signature card. This act probably constitutes an ac-
ceptance of the gift. As to other types of joint property, long-stand-
ing knowledge of the joint ownership will create a presumption of
acceptance which may be difficult to overcome.' 4
(5) Power of Appointment.-A power of appointment created
by will or trust agreement is essentially a limited and specialized
form of gift; as such, it should be subject to renunciation in the same
manner as any other bequest, devise, or gift in trust. In Ohio, a
renunciation of a power of appointment is specifically authorized by
the Revised Code 5 which provides that a donee of a power of ap-
pointment may disclaim the power in the same manner in which he
may release it. The disclaimer may be made at any time and may
be in whole or in part. The same statutory section provides for the
release of a power of appointment by an instrument in writing,
signed and acknowledged in the same manner prescribed for the
execution of deeds; however, the statute also makes it clear that this
method of release is not exclusive.
(6) Insurance.-No cases have been found in which the re-
nunciation of insurance proceeds was considered.'6 However, since
insurance represents a contract arrangement providing for a gift to
a third party beneficiary, there appears to be no reason why such
a renunciation cannot be made. If the insurance contract itself pro-
vides for the possibility of a renunciation, it seems clear that a re-
1 4 On the ground that a failure to renounce within a reasonable time creates a con-
clusive presumption of acceptance. See Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 8, 29 (1964).
15 Omuo REV. CODE § 1339.16. The section states "A donee or holder of a power
of appointment may disclaim the same at any time, wholly or in part, in the same man-
ner and to the same extent as he might release it."
1 6 But see Treas. Reg. § 20.2056d-1 (b) (1958) [hereinafter cited as Reg. §) which,
in an example given, assumes that such a renunciation can be made.
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nunciation could be made, since in such cases the gift itself may be
considered to be conditioned upon its acceptance by the donee. The
renunciation of insurance also involves fewer practical obstacles than
the renunciation of other forms of gifts. The beneficiary usually
is not required to sign any documents which might indicate accep-
tance. Further, a beneficiary's interest is commonly regarded as
little more than an expectancy, and knowledge of the designation
therefore is not likely to be equated to acceptance of the gift.
(7) Compensation for Acting as a Fiduciary.--One may
gratuitously render services to another. For this reason, it is dear
that a fiduciary may, by timely action, renounce or waive a statu-
tory right to executor's or trustee's fees. In two rulings,1 the Internal
Revenue Service (Service) has recognized that a timely waiver will
protect the fiduciary from being subjected to income tax and gift
tax upon the amount of the waived fee. If the waiver is not timely,
however, the adverse tax consequences ensue, presumably upon the
ground that the fiduciary has accepted the fee and, in fact, is in con-
structive receipt of it. 8 He thus can no longer renounce or waive
the fee. Unfortunately, in the later of the two rulings, 9 the Service
has obscured the theory by apparently proceeding upon the doctrine
of anticipatory assignment of income."0 If the application of this
doctrine is correct, even a timely tax-free waiver of fees is impossible,
since the anticipatory assignment doctrine is not predicated upon the
timing of the action, but rather upon the nature of the interest as-
signed. The Service's error arises from its failure to correctly recog-
nize the renunciation of a benefit in which timing is significant in
determining whether there has been an acceptance which precludes
later rejection.
(8) Statutory Tax Benefits.-The Internal Revenue Service
has ruled, in a somewhat unusual case, that the benefits of the fed-
eral estate tax marital deduction cannot be waived if qualified prop-
erty passes to the surviving spouse.' The ruling was based upon the
wording of section 2056(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, which
is phrased in the following mandatory terms: '[Tlhe value of the
taxable estate shall.., be determined by deducting... ." The same
1 7 Rev. Rul. 225, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 15; Rev. Rul. 472, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 21.
18 See Rev. Rul. 472, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 21, which adopts this theory.
19 Rev. Rul. 225, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 15.
2 0 The ruling cites Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), a case involving an
anticipatory assignment of income, in support of its conclusion.
2 1 Rev. Rul. 123, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 248.
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reasoning will likely be applied to most other statutory tax deduc-
tions, particularly if the failure to claim the deduction will result
in some other tax advantage. 2
C. Form and Legal Effect of Renunciation
(1) Form of Disclaimer.-The majority of courts hold that a
renunciation need not be in writing. 3 It may be made by dear and
unequivocal words or conduct. Although there is no direct holding
in Ohio on this point, dicta in one case indicates that Ohio will
probably follow the majority rule. 4 If intestate property of an
Ohio decedent is involved, however, section 2105.061 of the Re-
vised Code specifically requires that the renunciation be in writ-
ing.25  A written renunciation must also be unequivocal. If it is
couched in uncertain terms or is conditioned against the loss of other
benefits provided by the instrument, the renunciation may not be
recognized. 26
Several courts have upheld the validity of a renunciation made
by the fiduciary of a deceased donee's estate2 The question pre-
"sented in such cases is whether the fiduciary has the right to reject
the beneficial ownership of property where this action is in the im-
mediate interest of the estate, but, for tax or other reasons, may not
be in the best interest of the beneficiaries of the estate. The courts
have tended to adopt a more permissive approach and have permitted
renunciation, although a difficult policy question may arise when
creditors of the donee's estate are deprived of property which passes
to the same beneficiaries through an alternative route of inheri-
tance.
28
22 In Rev. Rul. 123, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 248, the fiduciary seeking the ruling de-
sired to obtain an advantage by reducing the taxable estate of the surviving spouse, who
had died shortly after the decedent, and by obtaining a credit for tax on prior transfers.
23See, e.g., Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641
(1933) (dictum) (applying Ohio law); First Nat'l Bank, 39 B.T.A. 828 (1939);
Coleman v. Burns, 103 N.B. 313, 171 A.2d 33 (1961); Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 8, 71
(1964). Contra, Pournelle v. Baxter, 151 Fla. 32, 9 So. 2d 162 (1942).
24 Brown v. Routzahn, supra note 23, at 916.
25 In addition, OtIo REV. CODE § 1339.16 provides for written renunciations of
powers of appointment but states that releases or renunciations of powers of appoint-
ment effected in any other form or manner shall not be affected.
26 Garfield v. White, 326 Mass. 20, 92 N.E.2d 575 (1950).
27Perkins v. Phinney, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 80496 (W.D. Tex. 1961) (deaths in
common accident); Sick v. Rock, 240 Iowa 584, 37 N.W.2d 305 (1949) (acceptance
of gift with conditions on it); In re Howe, 112 N.J. Eq. 17, 163 At. 234 (Prerogative
Ct. 1932) (deaths in common accident; renunciation four months later not timely).
28 Renunciations are generally recognized by the courts despite objections of cred-
itors. United States v. McCrackin, 189 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Ohio 1960) (applying
Ohio law); Ohio Nat'l Bank v. Miller, 57 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio Ct. App. 1944).
19661
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
(2) Irrevocability of Renunciation.-The Internal Revenue
Service has indicated that it will recognize a renunciation for tax
purposes only if the renunciation is irrevocable.2" The Service has
also indicated, however, that it ordinarily will consider a renuncia-
tion to be irrevocable if it is filed with the probate court. 0 This well-
defined stand is fortunate, since state law on the necessary elements
of an irrevocable renunciation is far from settled. It has been held
in a number of cases that a renunciation may be revoked at any time
if there has been no change of position by others in reliance upon
the renunciation."' Several cases in Ohio have also considered the
problem. In Erman v. Erman,2 an Ohio court of appeals specifically
held that a renunciation may be revoked. In United States v.
McCrackin,3 the Erman decision was cited by a federal district court
as indicative of Ohio law on the revocability of renunciations. How-
ever, in In re Estate of Wolfrua, 3" it was indicated that a written
renunciation filed with a court may be revoked only by a showing
of fraud or a mistake of fact. The case was decided upon a jurisdic-
tional point, however, and therefore the court's discussion of renun-
ciation is of limited precedential value. The authorities may be'
reconciled by considering a renunciation by word or conduct to be
revocable and a written renunciation filed with a court to be ir-
revocable. However, the cases have not expressly adopted this
distinction.
(3) Partial Renunciations.-If a person is given two separate
gifts under the same instrument, he may accept one gift and re-
nounce the other. 5 If there is a single gift, he cannot renounce a
burdensome part and, at the same time, accept a beneficial part."
However, there is very little authority as to whether a person may
make a partial renunciation of a single, uniform gift, such as cash.
Those cases which have considered the problem have permitted a
29 See Reg. § 20.2055-2 (1958) (estate tax charitable deduction); Rev. Rul. 225,
1964-2 CuM. BULL. 15; Rev. Rul. 472, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 21.
3 0 Reg. § 20.2055-2 (1958) (estate tax charitable deduction).
31 United States v. McCrackin, 189 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Ohio 1960) (applying Ohio
law); Erman v. Erman, 101 Ohio App. 245, 136 N.E.2d 385 (1956); In re Estate of
Copeland, 123 Vt. 32, 179 A.2d 475 (1962).
32 101 Ohio App. 245, 136 N.E.2d 385 (1956).
33 189 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Ohio 1960) (applying Ohio law).
34 120 Ohio App. 379, 202 N.E.2d 631 (1963).
3 5 Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933)
(applying Ohio law); Colett v. Cook & Mills, 3 Ohio C.C.R. 119 (Cir. Ct. 1888).
36 Colett v. Cook & Mills, supra note 35, at 125.
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partial renunciation." The treasury regulations state that the ques-
tion is dependent upon state law.38 These regulations represent a
considerable relaxation of the position originally advocated in the
proposed regulations. 9 Nevertheless, in actual practice the Ser-
vice has exhibited a strong reluctance to recognize a partial renun-.
ciation of a single gift. This position appears to be unfounded since
the existing case law supports a partial renunciation and it is diffi-
cult to conceive of any theoretical objections to such action.
D. What Constitutes an Acceptance of a Gift
(1) Timeliness.-A renunciation is a refusal to accept a gift;
therefore, it must be made within a reasonable time after the donee
has learned of the existence of the gift. If the donee fails to make
a timely renunciation, he is presumed to have accepted the prop-
erty. °
What constitutes a reasonable time depends upon all the facts
and circumstances. Some of these circumstances include: (a) the
donee's age; (b) his physical and mental condition; (c) his busi-
ness experience; (d) the complexity of the problem;41 (e) the
presence or lack of advisors; and (f) any change of circumstances
during the time intervening between the offer of the gift and the
ultimate renunciation.42 The last factor is particularly significant.
Obviously, if the donee does nothing until some event occurs which.
makes it undesirable for him to accept the property, the court will
assume that the donee decided to reject the gift only after that event
occurred.
(2) Ohio Law Regarding Timeliness.-The leading tax case
on the question of renunciation is Brown v. Routzahn," which was
37 Commissioner v. Macaulay's Estate, 150 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1945) (recognized
in federal estate tax case); Merritt's Estate, 155 App. Div. 228, 140 N.Y. Supp. 13
(1913) (recognized in New York inheritance tax case); Bronstein's Estate, 86 Pa. D&C
150 (Orphans' Ct. 1953). See also OHo REv. CODE § 1339.16 which permits a par-
tial renunciation of a power of appointment.
3SReg. 5 25.2511-1(c) (1958).89 Proposed Reg. § 25.2511-1(c), 22 Fed. Reg. 58 (1957) which contained this
subsequently deleted statement: "A renunciation of a portion of the property is not a
complete and unqualified refusal to accept the property to which one is entitled." Ibid.
40 Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958).
4 1 See Seifner v. Weller, 171 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1943), in which a renunciation by
a remainderman made fourteen years after the testator's death and sixteen months after
the life tenant's death was held to be timely, largely because of the complexity of the
problem facing the remainderman.
42 Camp v. United States, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 97167 (D. Ga. 1965) (jury instruc-
tions).
43 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933) (applying Ohio law).
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decided in 1933. In that case, the beneficiary of an estate waited
until the administration was completed before he renounced the
gift. The administration of the estate was not completed until seven
years after the decedent's death. Nevertheless, the court held that
the beneficiary's renunciation was timely and that under Ohio law
a renunciation may be made at any time prior to the acceptance of
the gift. The import of the decision is that an acceptance occurs
only if dominion or control over the property is exercised, or some
other deliberate and unequivocal act indicating an intention to do so
is performed; acceptance never arises from mere lapse of time. The
Brown case has been cited repeatedly by the courts." Neverthe-
less, it is doubtful whether it constitutes reliable law today, since
the holding is contrary to the weight of authority that an undue
delay, in itself, will constitute an acceptance of the gift. 5
(3) Remainder Interests.-A difficult problem as to timeliness
is presented when a remainderman wishes to renounce his remainder
interest. The remainder interest frequently is contingent on the
happening of some event, and the remainderman does not know
whether he will ever succeed to the property. Under such circum-
stances, may he wait until the life tenant dies before renouncing, or
must he renounce within a reasonable time after he learns of the
existence of the possible gift? Several state court decisions indicate
that he may validly renounce after the life tenant's death,4" but no
federal tax cases have been decided on the point. One writer has
stated that the Internal Revenue Service will not consider as timely a
renunciation made after the death of the life tenant.
47
44 United States v. McCrackin, 189 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Ohio 1960) (applying Ohio
law); Erman v. Erman, 101 Ohio App. 245, 136 N.E.2d 385 (1956); In re Estate of
Krakoff, 179 N.E.2d 566 (Ohio P. Cr. 1961); In re Hartman's Estate, 29 Ohio Op.
256 (P. Ct. 1944).
4 5 Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 8, 29 (1964).
46 Seifner v. Weller, 171 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1943); Coleman v. Burns, 103 N.H.
313, 171 A.2d 33 (1961); Dare v. New Brunswick Trust Co., 122 N.J. Eq. 349, 194
Ad. 61 (Ch. 1937) (dictum).
47 See Lentz, Income and Gift Tax Effects of Renunciation of a Bequest or Inher-
itance, N.Y.U. 21ST INST. ON FED. TAx 313, 324 (1963). Although all the facts and
circumstances must be considered, the following have been held not to preclude the pos-
sibility of a renunciation: (1) acting as a co-executor, Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d
914 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933) (applying Ohio law); (2) acting
as trustee, Estate of Ida F. Doane, 10 T.C. 1258 (1948); Cf. Cerf v. Commissioner,
141 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1944); (3) electing to take under will, Brown v. Routzahn,
supra; In re Hartman's Estate, 29 Ohio Op. 256 (P. Ct. 1944).
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E. Tax Consequences of Renunciation
(1) Gift Tax.-A critical consideration in all renunciation
situations is the potential gift tax liability of the donor. If the re-
nunciation is timely, there is simply a refusal to accept property by
the donee and no gift tax liability is imposed. However, if the re-
nunciation is not timely, the action will be considered to be an as-
signment rather than a renunciation, and a taxable gift will have
been effected.48 It is therefore imperative that one carefully examine
his position before proceeding with a renunciation or, at least, con-
sider the consequences of an unfavorable attitude on the part of the
Internal Revenue Service.
(2) Estate Tax Charitable Deduction.-If property passes to
a qualified charity as the result of a renunciation, a federal estate
tax charitable deduction will be allowed for the amount of the
property so passing.49 Section 2055 (a) of the Internal Revenue
Code imposes two conditions upon the allowance of the deduction:
(1) the renunciation must be made before the date prescribed for
filing the federal estate tax return; and (2) the renunciation must
be irrevocable. If a power to consume, invade, or appropriate prop-
erty for the benefit of an individual, terminates as a result of such
individual's death prior to the due date for filing the return and
prior to any exercise of the appropriation power, a charitable deduc-
tion will be allowed for any property which passes to a qualified
charity upon such individual's death." This result apparently ob-
tains only when there is a power in the fiduciary or beneficiary .to
divert property from the charity to the individual. If a charity re-
ceives property as an alternative taker, because of the death of a
beneficiary prior to a distribution date, no charitable deduction is
allowed even though the property passes before the due date for
filing the return." In the latter case, death is not the equivalent
of a disclaimer.
A renunciation can be used effectively as a postmortem estate
planning device in certain cases in which remainder interests are
vested in qualified charitable organizations. If the trustee is author-
ized by the terms of the instrument to invade the principal for the
life tenant's benefit, and the standard for invading the principal has
4 8 Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958).
4 9 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2055 (a) [hereinafter cited as CODE fl.
50 ibid.
51 City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Ohio
1962), affl'd, 312 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1963).
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been too broadly stated to permit a charitable deduction, the chari-
table deduction may nevertheless be saved by a timely renunciation
of all interest in the principal by the life tenant. 2
(3) Marital Deduction.-If property passes to a surviving
spouse as the result of a renunciation, no marital deduction is allow-
able.53 The congressional policy in this area of the law is not to
permit postmortem estate planning, since the possibilities of abuse
are much greater in transactions among family members than in
cases in which a charity is the beneficiary of the disclaimed prop-
erty.
54
(4) Powers of Appointment.-If a power of appointment
created after October 21, 1942 is released by the donee of the power,
this release constitutes a transfer which is subject to gift tax."5 How-
ever, a renunciation is not considered to be a taxable release for this
purpose.5" Inasmuch as a release and a renunciation both involve
an extinguishment of the power by the donee's action, the distin-
guishing factor between a release and a renunciation is again the
timing of the action. A timely refusal to accept the power is a re-
nunciation; the same action taken after a reasonable period of time
has elapsed will probably constitute an acceptance of the power and
a taxable release.
(5) Trust Income Tax.-A number of cases have recognized,
for income tax purposes, renunciations of the right to receive trust
income."  Several of these cases, however, have not permitted the
renunciation to operate retroactively. Instead, they have treated the
renunciation as though it were an assignment which was effective
in relieving the beneficiary from tax liability upon future income,
but not upon income earned or accrued prior to the time of the re-
nunciation.5" This treatment is apparently based upon two theories.
52 See Estate of James M. Schoonmaker, Jr., 6 T.C. 404 (1946). See also Camp v.
United States, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 97167 (D. Ga. 1965), for use of such renunciation
for other tax purposes.
5
s CODE § 2056(d) (2).
54 However, H.R. 483, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) which was reported out by the
House Committee on Ways and Means on October 14, 1965, would permit a marital
deduction for property passing to a surviving spouse as the result of a disclaimer. 2
FED. EsT. & GIFT TAx REP. 5 8404 (Sept. 25, 1965).
5 5 CODE § 2514(b).
56 Ibid.
57 See, e.g., Frances Marcus, 22 T.C. 824 (1954); First Nat'l Bank, 39 B.T.A. 828
(1939). See also Rev. Ru. 62, 1964-1 CuM. BULl. 221.
58 Grant v. Smith, 174 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1949); Kathryn S. Fuller, 37 T.C. 147
(1961); Robert E. Cleary, 34 T.C. 728 (1960); Frances Marcus, supra note 57; First
Nat'l Bank, supra note 57, at 833 (dissenting opinion); Rev. Rul. 62, 1964-1 CuM.
BULL 221.
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The first is the constructive receipt doctrine under which a person is
charged with all income which he may appropriate at will for his
own use. The second arises from the fact that income tax is deter-
mined upon a periodic basis; the courts apparently have assumed
that the tax must be measured by considering only those events
which occur during the taxable period. Neither of these approaches
appears to be valid. While constructive receipt requires the accep-
tance of a benefit and a temporary deferral of its enjoyment, the
essence of a renunciation is the absence of an acceptance. A renun-
ciation also relates back to the date of the gift and the fact that the
renunciation actually occurs after the end of a taxable period should
be irrelevant.
Finally, it should be noted that if a beneficiary possesses a
power over the corpus or the income of a trust which causes the in-
come to be taxable to him, the Code expressly permits a disclaimer
of the power if the disclaimer is made within a reasonable time af-
ter the beneficiary first becomes aware of its existence.59
(6) Inheritance Tax.-Renunciations have been recognized for
state inheritance tax purposes,60 although the argument frequently
has been made that taxable successions to the estate are determined
as of the moment of death and cannot be altered by subsequent
action by a beneficiary."' Since this argument is contrary to the
generally accepted theory that a renunciation relates back to the date
of the gift, it has not been accepted by the courts.
J1. ASSIGNMENT OR RELEASE
A. What Can Be Assigned
In general, any property or contractual interest capable of be-
ing owned may be assigned. Both an interest in a decedents estate"2
and an interest in a trust 3 are assignable unless assignment is re-
stricted by the dispositive instrument; the only requirement is that
the assignee be certain. Even assignments of contingent interests
and expectancies have been recognized by courts of equity if the as-
signments were fairly made, supported by consideration, and not
5 9 CODE § 678(d).
60 Tax Comnm'r v. Glass, 119 Ohio St. 389, 164 N.E. 425 (1928); In re Bute's Es-
tate, 355 Pa. 170,49 A.2d 339 (1946).
6 1 Hershey v. Bowers, 1 Ohio App. 2d 511, 205 NE.2d 580 (1965); In re Bauer,
191 N.E.2d 859 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962); In re Bute's Estate, supra note 60, at 340.
626 AM. JUR. 2d Assignments § 24 (1963).
63 54 AM. JuR. Trusts § 10 (1945).
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against public policy. 4 Ohio, by statute, permits the assignment of
contingent remainders, executory interests, and other expectant es-
tates;65 no requirement of consideration is imposed. Contractual
interests involving personal service or a confidential relationship
cannot be assigned; however, these interests usually are not involved
in probate and trust estates and hence are beyond the scope of this
discussion.
B. Restrictions on Assignment
A party creating an interest may also prohibit its transfer. A
common example is a trust spendthrift clause which prohibits a vol-
untary or involuntary alienation of a beneficiary's interest in the
trust. In Sherrow v. Brookover," the Ohio Supreme Court refused
to recognize the validity of a spendthrift clause as against the in-
terest of a creditor of the trust beneficiary. However, the spend-
thrift clause in issue merely prohibited the alienation of the benefici-
ary's interest, without any threatened termination, and the court ex-
pressly confined its decision to clauses of that nature. The validity
of the more common type of clause, in which an attempted aliena-
tion by the beneficiary will result in a termination of his interest,
has not been litigated in Ohio and remains an open question, al-
though the validity of such clauses is commonly assumed.
United States Savings Bonds are an example of property in-
terests, the transfer of which is restricted by the issuing organization.
Such savings bonds may not be transferred except in limited circum-
stances, such as death, disability, or situations involving a transfer
from one co-owner to another.67
6 4 6 AM. JUR. 2d Assignments § 8 at 192.3 (1963).
6 5 OHIO REV. CODE § 2131.04. The section states: "Remainders, whether vested
or contingent, executory interests, and other expectant estates are descendible, devisable,
and alienable in the same manner as estates in possession."
66 174 Ohio St. 310, 189 N.E.2d 90 (1963).
67 There is a split of authority as to whether such bonds nevertheless may be the
subject of a gift by delivery and evidence of an intention to make a gift. Cases holding
that a gift may be made take the position that the restrictions against transfer are for
the benefit of the federal government only and do not control property rights between
individuals. Cases holding to the contrary find a governmental policy to spread owner-
ship of the public debt. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 788 (1955). In Ohio, a lower
court decision has held that such bonds cannot be transferred. Collins v. Jordan, 110
N.E.2d 825 (Ohio C.P. 1950), appeal dismissed, 113 N.E.2d 911 (Ohio Ct. App.
1950).
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C. Tax Consequences of Assignments
In some cases the assignment of certain property interests will
immediately accelerate the taxation of income, and the tax practi-
tioner should be aware of this possibility.
(1) Income in Respect of a Decedent.-The Internal Revenue
Code specifically provides for the taxation of income in respect of
a decedent to the decedent's estate or to his beneficiary when such
income is received. However, an assignment of the right to the
income, other than one effecting a normal distribution to or from an
estate, will cause the income to be taxed at the time of the assign-
ment and prior to its actual receipt.68
(2) Installment Obligations.--In certain circumstances, in-
come from the sale of real estate and personal property sold on an
installment basis may, for tax purposes, be reported periodically
as payments are made.6" However, if such obligations are assigned,
other than by reason of death, taxation of the income is accelerated
to the year of assignment.7"
(3) Increment of United States Savings Bonds.-The Internal
Revenue Service has ruled that the unreported increment on United
States Savings Bonds becomes taxable upon the voluntary assign-
ment of the bonds by the purchasing owner to another.7 The basis
for taxability is the realization of income doctrine under which one
may realize income from a transaction other than a sale such as by
gift. 1
(4) Accrued Income on Debt Obligations.--Accrued interest
on indebtedness will become taxable immediately upon assignment
under the same reasoning applicable in the taxation of increment on
government savings bonds.7"
In all of the cases, the gratuitous assignment constitutes a tax-
able gift even though the interest assigned may be highly coitin-
gent in nature.7" The contingency is relevant in determining the
value of the gift, but does not negate the fact of the gift.
68 CODE § 691(a) (2).
69 CoDn § 453 (b).
70 CODE § 453 (d).
71 Rev. Rul. 143, 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 12; Rev. Rul. 278, 1955-1 CUM. BULL.
471. But see Rev. Rul. 104, 1964-1 CUM. BULL. 223.
7 2 Income Tax Unit Ruling 3011, XV-2 CUM. BULL. 132 (1936).
73 See, e.g., Goodwin v. McGowan, 47 F. Supp. 498 (W.D. N.Y. 1942); Rev. Rul.
S8, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 417 (contingent remainder taxable for estate tax purposes).
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D. Trust Interests
The assignment of interests in trust income has given rise to
much tax litigation on the question of whether the assignment is
effective to shift the tax burden on future trust income to the as-
signee. The leading case in this area is Blair v. Commissioner,74 in
which the United States Supreme Court held that the assignment of
a life estate effectively shifted the tax burden on future income to
the donee on the ground that the life estate constituted a substantial
property interest and the transaction was not merely an anticipatory
assignment of future income. The case is also authority for a shift
of the tax burden to the donee of a fractional portion of a life estate.
However, if the interest transferred is less than a life estate in dura-
tion, difficult problems of interpretation may be encountered. In
Blair, the Court indicated that the transfer must be of a substantial
interest,7 but it declined to lay down any further guidelines. Later,
in Harrison v. Schaffner,76 the Court held that the assignment of
one year's income was not an assignment of a substantial interest,
and that the assigned income therefore remained taxable to the as-
signor. However, the Internal Revenue Service has filled in the re-
sulting void by ruling that a transfer of income for a period of ten
years or more is substantial and operates to shift income tax liabil-
ity." The Service was obviously influenced by the ten-year short-
term trust statute; 78 if an owner may shift income tax liability by
transferring the income for a ten-year period, then clearly a benefi-
ciary should be able to do the same. Thus, the cut-off period is ten
years unless a charity is the assignee. In the latter case, a transfer
of two year's income should be sufficient upon the analogy to the
short-term trust statute which permits an owner to shift two year's.
income to a qualified charitable organization.79
74300 U.S. 5 (1937).
75 Id. at 13.
76312 U.S. 579 (1941).
77 Rev. Rul. 38, 1955-1 CuM. BuLL. 389.
7 8 CODE § 673 (a).
7 9 CODE § 673 (b). For the sake of completeness, the statutory tax rules relating t(>
the exercise or release of a power of appointment should be stated inasmuch as they in
effect cause an assignment of property interests. As to general powers of appointment
created prior to October 21, 1942, an exercise during lifetime constitutes a taxable gift,
but a complete release is not deemed to be an exercise. CODE § 2514(a). As to a
general power of appointment created after that date, either an exercise or a release-
during lifetime constitutes a taxable gift. CODE § 2514(b). A limited power of ap-
pointment may be exercised or released without gift tax consequences.
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III. SALES
The subject of sales of probate and trust interests has been
largely preempted by the sale of trust income interests. This latter
area has given rise to much litigation, largely because of the very
attractive tax advantages to be achieved. This portion of the discus-
sion will therefore be confined to the sale interests in trust income.
A. Income Tax Effect Upon the Seller
It is now settled that the sale of a life estate interest in a trust
is the sale of a capital asset which gives rise to a capital gain or
loss.8" Thus, by selling his income interest, a trust income benefi-
ciary not only receives his income in advance, but also converts it
from ordinary income to capital gain, and perhaps even to a capital
loss depending upon his cost basis for the income interest. The In-
ternal Revenue Service argued strenuously in the courts that the
consideration for a sale of a life interest is nothing more than an
advance payment of future income.8 In addition, it has urged a
distinction between an "assignment" of the income and a "surrender"
of it to the remainderman.8 Both of these arguments have been
repeatedly and consistently rejected by the courts and the Service is
now resigned to attacking such sales only if they represent tax-moti-
vated schemes. The extent of the Service's capitulation was demon-
strated in Gladys Cheesman Evans,8" in which the taxpayer sold her
life interest in a trust containing closely held stock to her husband
in return for a consideration payable over her lifetime. The closely
held company thereafter paid dividends sufficient in amounts to
cover the payments scheduled to be paid to her by her husband. The
Tax Court concluded that the transaction represented the sale of a
capital asset. Despite the fact that the source of the income re-
mained the same, the time of its receipt was not substantially
changed, and the only material change was the tax treatment of the
income; the Service dispiritedly entered its acquiescence to this case.'
By analogy to the assignment of income cases, the sale of any
substantial interest in a trust, although less than a life estate, will
also give rise to a capital gain or loss. However, no cases have yet
80 Allen v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 157 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1946); McAllister
v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946); Bell's Estate v. Commissioner, 137
F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943); Sayers F. Harman, 4 T.C. 335 (1944), acq., 1945 CuM.
BULL. 3.
81Belrs Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 80, at 455.
82 McCallister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946).
83 30 T.C. 798 (1958), acq., 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 5.
84 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 5.
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been decided on the point. The application of the reasoning adopted
in the assignment of income cases also permits the conclusion that
a sale of ten year's income or more is a sale of a capital asset.
The income tax basis for computing gain or loss of a life estate
interest (or other income interest) is determined by apportioning
the basis of the underlying trust assets between the income benefi-
ciary and the remainderman. The apportionment is made in ac-
cordance with each beneficiary's actuarial interest in the trust."
These interests are calculated by using the appropriate tables set
forth in the regulations for valuing income interests and remainders
for estate and gift tax purposes.86 Thus, it may be observed that
both the fair market value and the income tax basis of the life estate
interest decrease as the life tenant becomes older.
B. Income Tax Effect Upon the Purchaser
The purchaser of a life estate interest in trust income is also
favorably regarded by the courts. The courts have held, and the
Service now agrees, that the purchaser is entitled to recover his cost
by amortizing it over the life tenant's expectancy by ratable annual
deductions." Thus, if the purchaser pays 10,000 dollars for a life
estate and the life tenant's expectancy is ten years, the purchaser may
deduct 1,000 dollars per year in his income tax return for a period
of ten years. The deduction is permitted on the ground that the
purchaser has acquired an exhaustible asset and by analogy to the
law developed in regard to purchases of leasehold interests."8 Ini-
tially, the Service argued that if the sale is by a life tenant to the re-
mainderman, there is a merger of interests and nothing remains to
be amortized." It has now abandoned this argument, however, and
is left only with the right to challenge the bona fides of a transac-
tion if the transaction is a blatant tax avoidance scheme.9"
C. Estate Tax Consequences
The remaining point of controversy regarding the sale of trust
8 5 Income Tax Unit Ruling 3911, 1948-1 Cum. BULL. 66.
8 6 Reg. § 20.2031-7(f) (1958) (estate tax); Reg. § 25.2512-5(f) (1958) (gift
tax).
87 Commissioner v. Fry, 283 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1960), affirm ing 31 T.C. 522
(1958); Bell v. Harrison, 212 F.2d 253 (7th Cit. 1954); Rev. Rul. 132, 1962-2 CuM.
BULL. 73. The Service argued that the purchaser should be permitted to recoup his
cost only when he sold or otherwise disposed of the assets.
8 8 Bell v. Harrison, supra note 87 at 255.
89 Id. at 254.
9 0 Rev. Rul. 132, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 73.
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income interests lies in the estate tax field. It arises when an original
owner has previously created a trust while reserving a life estate
which he later wishes to sell. In United States v. Allen,9 decided
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1961, the settlor sold her
life estate interest to her son in contemplation of death, thereby com-
pletely divesting herself of any interest in the trust. The court never-
theless included the trust in her taxable estate, relying upon congres-
sional intent and general policy considerations, but without specifi-
cally indicating any statutory provision upon which it relied. It is
possible to sustain the holding under section 2036 of the Code on
the ground that the sale of the life estate merely accelerated the re-
ceipt of income. However, nothing in the opinion indicates that
section 2036 was the basis for the decision, and this line of reason-
ing was previously rejected by the Tax Court in Estate of Robert J.
Cuddihy."2 If the contemplation of death provisions of section 2035
were the basis of the holding, then the question of adequacy of con-
sideration must be resolved. While the consideration was dearly
equal to the value of the life estate, it was still inadequate if the value
of the entire trust be considered. The case, therefore, is authority for
the proposition that the consideration given must be equal to the
amount removed from the taxable estate; however, this is objection-
able from an economic viewpoint, since no purchaser would ever pay
such an amount. Such reasoning also runs counter to the trend in
other areas of the estate tax law. 3 It also may be argued that since
neither a transfer with a retained income nor a transfer in contem-
plation of death may escape tax, a transfer combining the elements
of both, although not fitting either category precisely, should not es-
cape taxation. The policy considerations to the contrary are highly
persuasive, however, since an opposite holding would lead to the
avoidance of tax by the simple expedient of a death-bed sale for a
nominal amount. This is more than the already well-favored tax-
payer has the right to expect in selling trust interests.
O1 United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944
(1961).
92 32 T.C. 1171 (1959).
9 3 See Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949), in which
a joint tenancy was converted into a tenancy in common in contemplation of death.
Although the decedent had contributed all the funds toward acquisition of the joint
asset, only one-half of the asset was included in his taxable estate on the ground that
the interest transferred to the survivor in contemplation of death was in exchange for
an adequate consideration i.e., the spouses sold their respective joint tenancy rights to
each other in exchange for undivided interests in the asset. It should be noted that the
consideration did not equal the amount removed from the taxable estate.
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